A Word to Friends Who Are Still Debating God's Soveriengty and Man's Free Will

Recently, some friends and I have been obsessing over the Sovereignty of God vs. The Free Will of Man debate. As anyone who has participated in this debate knows, at the heart of the discussion is the question, "Does man have a moral responsibility?"  In other words, if man's fallen state is to be defined in such a way that he has no capacity to choose to have faith in God, then one must ask, "Is man responsible for his sin and thus condemned over that for which he apparently has no control?" Stated another way, is belief in God's Sovereignty required because man has no ability to choose or is God's Sovereignty such that it remains in tact in spite of the choices of man's free will? It amounts to two conclusions: If man can choose, then he is morally responsible for his choice. If he cannot choose, and all is pre-determined, then there is no logical reason to believe he is responsible because God alone is the sole determiner of who is saved and, by default, who goes to hell. Though a simplistic summary, this is the essence of the debate.

The significance of the discussion is seen not only in its obvious impact on one's doctrine of election belief, but also on one's doctrine of God, and doctrine of man to say nothing of one's soteriology, hamartiology and pneumatology.

In light of these obsessions within the discussion, a significant article was found, provided by the Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society. It not only summarizes the present state of the debate, but it makes a stunning case for the need to suspend the debate until what is meant by man's moral responsibility and the extent of his freedom can be more precisely determined. That the Bible teaches man has this moral responsibility is obvious to almost all. But how is one to define moral responsibility and what is the extent of this freedom of will?

My intent for presenting the following article is first, to prevent me from having to take the time to respond because my time constraints due to my being a Ph.D. student is significant. Second, I long for my friends to see that this debate is far greater than we have conceived it to be and as such, we might want to tread more cautiously in our assumptions that anyone has provided sufficient answers. Finally, it is intended for any who might be willing to read it if for no other reason than to validate that if such a debate is unresolved after these many centuries, it is unlikely to be resolved in this century either and be warned against those who might state otherwise.

At the center of this discussion is the fact that there are two absolutes which stand as witness to man's inability to reconcile them. Each is a biblical absolute and thus true, in spite of our failure to understand how such a thing is possible. The two absolutes in question are: 1) God is supremely Sovereign 2) Man has a free will and is accountable for his own choices. It's time for us to realize that these facts are meant, at least in part, to be a testimony to both the transcendence of God's wisdom and the significant foolishness of man for believing he can begin to comprehend that wisdom.

Finally, for those very few who might wonder about why a theologically conservative Baptist such as myself, is appealing to the work of someone who teaches at Biola, there are two things to keep in mind. First, Biola's doctrinal statement affirms biblical inerrancy. Second, this article is published by the Evangelical Theological Society located in Lynchburg, VA. In other words, build a bridge and get over it!! This is not a theologically liberal document. It meets the standards of ETS.

Now, enjoy the article and let me know what you think.

____________

 Suspending The Debate About Divine Sovereignty And Human Freedom 

David M. Ciocchi*

* David M. Ciocchi is associate professor of philosophy at Biola University, 13800 Biola Avenue, La Mirada, CA 90639.

The debate about divine sovereignty and human freedom is a series of competing attempts to reconcile two apparently conflicting components of Christian belief. Each of these attempts, or reconciliation projects, offers an account of how it can be true both that God is sovereign (omnipotent and omniscient) and that human beings have the sort of freedom necessary for moral responsibility. This debate continues despite longstanding objections to it. I maintain that these objections fail, but that there is another, and better, way to object to the debate. Rather than taking the line of the traditional objections by rejecting all future work on divine sovereignty and human freedom, I argue that we should suspend this debate until we solve the logically prior problem of determining what it is about human beings that justifies God in treating them as morally responsible agents.

I. Objections To The Debate

  When an intellectual debate persists for centuries, there are likely to be thinkers who question not the standard positions defended by participants in the debate but the legitimacy of the debate itself. This has been true of the debate about divine sovereignty and human freedom (DSF debate). In this section I consider three objections to the DSF debate, two of which are long-standing objections that reject the debate outright, and one of which is a contemporary objection that views the debate as logically premature, and calls for its suspension.
  1. Rejecting the debate. The first traditional way to reject the DSF debate may be termed the “impiety objection.” This objection has its roots in the clash between the monasteries and universities in the Middle Ages, when pious monks grew suspicious of the practice by theologians of applying logical arguments to the mysteries of divine revelation.1  A classic example of the impiety objection appears in this passage about predestination and election from The Formula of Concord:
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 574
      For, in addition to what has been revealed in Christ concerning this, of which we have hitherto spoken, God has still kept secret and concealed much concerning this mystery, and reserved it for His wisdom and knowledge alone, which we should not investigate, nor should we indulge our thoughts in this matter, nor draw conclusions, nor inquire curiously, but should adhere entirely to the revealed Word of God.2
  The impiety objection, then, is the claim that it is offensive to God when anyone makes use of reason in an effort to go beyond what is explicitly stated in Scripture in order to secure a fuller understanding of God’s truth. So if, for instance, God has revealed both that he is sovereign in salvation and that we are accountable for our response to his grace, but he has not revealed how these two teachings fit together, then we must not “draw conclusions” or “inquire curiously” about the matter. Such an effort would be an impious attempt to uncover what God “has still kept secret and concealed,” an expression of intellectual pride.
  Medieval proponents of the impiety objection were deeply concerned about the motivation of thinkers who applied their university training in logic to theological matters. For instance, monastic theologian Rupert of Deutz condemned those who dared to examine “the secrets of God in the Scriptures in a presumptuous way, motivated by curiosity and not by love,” declaring that they “became heretics” and “proud” and were “not to be admitted to the sight of divinity and truth.”3  Clearly, then, if this impiety objection is reasonable— if it makes sense to claim that those who use reason to go beyond the explicit statements of Scripture are offending God and guilty of intellectual pride—participants in the DSF debate should repent by abandoning their debate for all future purposes.
  Despite its strong emotional impact on some monastic theologians and other persons in later times, the impiety objection is not reasonable. There are two grounds for dismissing it from further consideration. The first is that this objection to the DSF debate is logically self-defeating, since it is itself the result of an application of reason to divine revelation. The Bible nowhere states the impiety objection, so an advocate of that objection must argue that it is a logical implication of what the Bible does say. Proponents of the DSF debate are free to respond by arguing that their opponents are mistaken. The second basis for dismissing the impiety objection is the fact that intellectual pride and other impious motivation is not a necessary feature of the DSF debate. Participants in the debate can be motivated by love for God and a humble desire to serve him better through gaining a greater understanding of divine sovereignty and human freedom. They can acknowledge that there always will be limits to their understanding, and that God may well choose
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 575
  to keep some things secret. Given all this, it is reasonable to suppose that the DSF debate will please God rather than offend him.
  The second traditional way to reject the DSF debate may be called the “futility objection.” Roughly, this objection is the argument that since the Bible’s teaching about divine sovereignty and human freedom constitutes a paradox, it follows that any effort to reconcile the two is an exercise in futility. So rather than pursuing the DSF debate, “we must accept the concept of paradox, believing that what we cannot square with our finite minds is somehow harmonized in the mind of God.”4  Hoekema and other supporters of the futility objection see it as an expression of theological necessity, in keeping with standard Christian responses to other paradoxes, such as God’s being both one and three and Jesus as God and man. As Chesterton put it, “Christianity got over the difficulty of combining furious opposites by keeping them both, and keeping them both furious.”5
  The futility objection’s appeal to paradox may be taken in two senses. In the first sense, it is an appeal to logical contradiction. If the concepts of divine sovereignty and human freedom are logically contradictory, then it is impossible to reconcile them and the DSF debate is futile. In the second sense, it is an appeal to apparent contradiction. In this sense the concepts of divine sovereignty and human freedom are not really contradictory, but they are such that finite human beings necessarily see them as contradictory, and so cannot reconcile them. So, again, the DSF debate is futile.6
  With a possible exception in St. Peter Damian (1007–1072), Christian thinkers have denied that God can make contradictory claims true, so it is safe to say that the futility objection appeals to paradox in the sense of apparent contradiction. Understood in this sense, the futility objection rejects the DSF debate as an intellectual project that exceeds human capacity. God can harmonize divine sovereignty and human freedom; human beings cannot.
  Even a cursory examination of this objection reveals that it is no more reasonable than the impiety objection. Either divine sovereignty and human freedom receive an intellectual formulation or they do not. In the latter case, the terms are presented without clarification or definition, on the assumption that we will have an intuitive grasp of the meaning of each and, consequently, of their (apparent) logical inconsistency. In the former case, the terms are given clear definitions, which can then be compared to determine whether they are logically consistent with each other. Either way, the futility objection fails.
  On the “intuitive grasp” approach, the most anyone can say is that some persons claim to detect a tension between divine sovereignty and human freedom, which might suggest (not establish) that the two concepts are logically contradictory. This amounts to very little, since without definitions
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 576
  it is not clear just what concepts are thought to be in tension and possibly contradictory. By contrast, the “clear definitions” approach makes it evident whether the two concepts are logically consistent or contradictory. But this, too, amounts to very little, because any definitions of “divine sovereignty” and “human freedom” can be—and will be—contentious, subject to serious and continuing dispute. So it is not evident that the concepts of divine sovereignty and human freedom are, or necessarily appear to be, logically contradictory. If there is something wrong about the DSF debate, it is not that it is impious or futile to engage in the debate. It is possible to question its legitimacy without rejecting in principle, as these two objections do, all future work on the relation of divine sovereignty and human freedom.
  2. Suspending the debate. Recall that the DSF debate is a series of attempts to explain how it can be true both that God is sovereign (omnipotent and omniscient) and that human beings have the sort of freedom necessary for moral responsibility. This debate rests on two assumptions. The first is that we know what sort of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. And the second is that there appears to be reason to doubt that the existence and activity of a sovereign God is compatible with that sort of freedom. The second assumption presupposes the first, so if there are grounds for rejecting the first assumption, the entire basis for the DSF debate collapses.
  As I will argue in the next section of this paper, there are excellent grounds for rejecting the first assumption. We do not know what sort of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. We should, therefore, suspend the DSF debate while we work on the logically prior problem of determining what it is about human beings that justifies God in treating them as morally responsible agents.
  Theologians, philosophers, scientists, and other thinkers working on this problem have generated three broad solutions to it. The first solution is not really a solution but rather a denial that the problem can be solved; it is the view that human beings are not morally responsible agents. Advocates of this view range from neuroscientists who argue that the conscious mind is an epiphenomenon of the brain’s neural activity to philosophers who maintain that the concepts of freedom and moral responsibility are incoherent.7  The second solution is the view that there are facts about human beings that, while they do not permit a robust, traditional conception of moral responsibility, do justify some of our standard moral practices.8  Then there is the third solution, the view that the traditional conception of human beings as morally responsible agents is fully justified.
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 577
  Christian thinkers should study all three solutions. They should study the first two solutions, even though they are inconsistent with Christian belief, because they raise problems that must be addressed by proponents of the third solution. And they must pay careful attention to the third solution, since it alone is consistent with Christian belief, so that the correct account of human freedom (whatever that may be) will be a version of this solution.
  Participants in the DSF debate persist in working on their reconciliation projects because either (1) they are unfamiliar with the literature on freedom and responsibility, and so have no idea that there are disputes about what sort of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility, or (2) they are familiar with it, or with some of it, and they think it is obvious that one particular version of the third solution is correct. On both (1) and (2) the participants in the DSF debate retain the assumption that we know what sort of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility, and with it they have a rational basis for continuing their debate.
  In the next section of this paper, I argue that long-standing disputes between supporters of competing versions of the third solution—i.e. accounts of the freedom necessary for moral responsibility—have generated an intellectual stalemate. I also argue that no appeal to biblical teaching has a chance of ending that stalemate. The conclusion is that it is not reasonable to claim that we can identify the sort of freedom necessary for moral responsibility. There is, therefore, no rational basis for continuing the DSF debate. For this reason that debate should be suspended.

    II. The Stalemate About Human Freedom

  Taking the term “free will” to designate whatever sort of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility, we can classify traditional supporters of moral responsibility as either compatibilists (free will is compatible with determinism) or incompatibilists (free will is not compatible with determinism).9  Accounts of free will advanced by compatibilists are normally called “com-patibilist,” and those advanced by incompatibilists are called “libertarian.”
  Over the last thirty-five years or so there has been an enormous quantity of writing and discussion about competing free will theories. Some very fine arguments have been offered for and against all the standard versions of free will theory, compatibilist and incompatibilist. The result appears to be a stalemate, in which the arguments for one theory cannot be shown to be superior to the arguments for any other. One prominent libertarian, Peter van Inwagen, goes so far as to declare that the existence of free will is a mystery. His comments are worth quoting at length:
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 578
      Free will is a mystery because, although it obviously exists—of course we sometimes confront a choice between A and B and are, while we are trying to decide whether to do A or to do B, able to do A and able to do B—it seems to be incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, and thus seems to be impossible. When he says that free will seems to be incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism, van Inwagen means that there are good arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism and good arguments for the incompatibility of free will and indeterminism, and that no one has ever identified a very plausible candidate for the flaw in any of the arguments for either class.10
  Van Inwagen thinks it is obvious that free will—he means libertarian free will—exists, but is troubled by good philosophical arguments that seem to show that its existence is logically impossible. Other philosophers suppose that it is reasonable to believe in compatibilist free will, but are vexed by good arguments against compatibilism which they have been unable to refute. Any fair-minded review of the current debate between free will theorists will conclude that if, in fact, there is a correct account of free will, there appears to be no hope of achieving agreement about what it is.11
  In what follows I will give brief descriptions of libertarian and compatibilist theories of free will, and will present some of the noteworthy problems each theory faces. After that, I will argue that the Bible will not help us determine which free will theory is correct.
  1. Libertarian free will. All libertarian accounts of free will presuppose that free will is incompatible with determinism, and so they locate an element of indeterminism somewhere in the causal history of free actions.12  For an action to be free in the sense that underwrites moral responsibility, it cannot be the causally necessary result of a set of antecedent conditions. An agent with libertarian free will has “leeway,” the genuine possibility that the choices he makes he might not have made. Besides leeway, the agent enjoys “control,” in that his free choices have their ultimate origin in himself, rather than in anything or anyone else. These choices are “up to him” in a profound sense.
  Libertarianism is the preferred view of free will for many participants in the DSF debate, and this is not at all surprising. The DSF debate consists
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 579
  of efforts to reconcile divine sovereignty and human freedom, efforts that would not be made apart from at least the appearance of conflict between these two concepts. When divine sovereignty (omnipotence and omniscience) is interpreted as a theological form of determinism, then it comes into conflict—really, not just apparently—with libertarian free will, the view of human freedom which is incompatible with determinism. Given that many thinkers regard some sort of determinism as the default position on divine sovereignty, and a libertarian account of free will as “natural” or “obviously true,” these thinkers have solid motivation to engage in the DSF debate.
  But is libertarian free will “natural” or “obviously true,” as Peter van Inwagen and others believe? If so, then the current and long-standing stalemate among free will theorists is hard to explain. In what follows I will present in summary form five lines of argument against libertarian free will.13
  The first line is the cultural limitations argument. To many persons in the Western world, libertarian free will seems obviously true, as instructors of introductory philosophy courses can testify.14  By contrast, members of societies whose traditions favor a fatalistic or deterministic approach to life seem to lack this affinity for libertarianism. It looks as if culture helps shape a person’s views of human agency, and as if there is no universal or even near-universal testimony in favor of libertarianism.
  The second line of argument against libertarian free will is the problem of the possible truth of determinism. As a theory that logically requires the falsity of determinism, libertarianism is vulnerable to evidence and arguments for the truth of determinism. And even though determinism is currently out of favor, notably in physics, it has not been conclusively falsified. In fact, some forms of quantum theory—the principal source for the rejection of determinism—are deterministic.15  So the possible truth of determinism implies the possible falsity of libertarian free will. And this threat to libertarianism is not offset by a corresponding threat to compatibilist free will, since most versions of compatibilism do not require the truth of determinism; instead, they simply hold that determinism and free will are compatible, so that if determinism is true, free will is not compromised.
  The third line of argument is the problem of indeterministic control. This argument sees symmetry between determinism and indeterminism with respect to their impact on an agent’s control over his choices and actions. Libertarians object to determinism on the supposition that if a set of antecedent causal factors determines an agent’s choice, then it makes no sense to attribute to that agent control over the choice. Given those antecedent factors, the agent could not have chosen otherwise. Some compatibilists respond by noting that no one can control what happens indeterministically,
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 580
  for by definition an indeterministic event is one that is not the necessary result of anything, including libertarian freedom. Some event-causal libertarians admit there is a problem here, and opt for versions of libertarian free will which allow for less control than robust, traditional libertarianism.16
  The fourth line is the incoherence argument. This is actually a set of related arguments, each member of which is directed against one or other version of libertarian free will. For instance, compatibilist philosophers note that some libertarians require a truly free agent to be the ultimate originator of his choices, and thus also the ultimate originator of his own character. But, say these philosophers, no one can have ultimate control over what he is; the notion of self-creation needed by these versions of libertarian free will is incoherent.
  The fifth line of argument is the problem of present luck. On any libertarian theory an agent has “leeway” and thus might choose one way or another, given the exact circumstances at the time of choice. Suppose that at time “T” Susan, a libertarian free agent, has a choice between A and not-A. Let’s say that at “T” she chooses A. According to this line of argument, her choice of A is just a matter of luck, because she might just as well at “T” have chosen not-A. Most libertarians will say that Susan has a reason or reasons for choosing A, and having those reasons explains her choice; but they will also say that she has a reason or reasons for choosing not-A. And, say the proponents of the problem of present luck, it is just a matter of luck that she acts on the reasons for “A” instead of the reasons for “not-A.”17
  2. Compatibilist free will. All compatibilist accounts of free will maintain that determinism is compatible with free will, but few of them require the truth of determinism. As I noted in the section on libertarian free will, most compatibilists believe that their view of free will is secure whether determinism is true or not. In other words, most compatibilists allow for the possibility that not everything that ever happens in the universe is causally necessitated by antecedent conditions. Still, they insist that there is at least one set of events—human free choices—that is causally necessitated by antecedent conditions. For all compatibilists, a free choice is the causally necessary product of a free agent’s character and circumstances.
  What may be called “classical compatibilism” is the philosophical thesis that what constitutes an agent’s strongest desire at a time will determine that agent’s choice at that time.18  These compatibilists claim that desire-determined choices are free and responsible choices, genuine expressions of the persons who make them. Although classical compatibilism gains some
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 581
  plausibility from the universal human experience of acting on desire, it has been subjected to powerful criticisms. Perhaps the most serious of these is the observation that classical compatibilism fails to take into account how an agent comes to have the desires on which he acts. Imagine that some manipulator—e.g. a hypnotist, a demon, or a gifted scientist—implanting a set of desires in someone without that person’s knowledge or consent. Assuming that the manipulator is clever enough to make the implanted desires stronger than any desires the person already has, he will succeed in controlling his victim’s choices. On any standard reading of classical compatibilism, the manipulated person is a free, responsible agent. But virtually everyone agrees that this agent is not free and responsible, so classical compatibilism loses any claim to plausibility.
  The discrediting of classical compatibilism is a piece of philosophical progress, but it has not ended the stalemate about free will. Instead, it has compelled compatibilists to revise their accounts of freedom. What may be called “contemporary compatibilism” is the result.19  All versions of this new approach to compatibilism offer lists of conditions that must be met if an agent’s choice is to count as a free and responsible choice, and all these lists feature insurance against manipulation. A contemporary compatibilist will argue for something like this: “A free and responsible agent acts intelligently on beliefs and desires he has acquired consciously, free from all forms of manipulation; he is aware of his beliefs and desires and is able to reflect about how he acquired them and about what may be said for and against each one; he is a competent deliberator who chooses only after making a careful review of all relevant facts.”
  Even if contemporary compatibilism is successful in overcoming the criticisms that discredited classical compatibilism, it is subject to a variety of serious objections. In what follows I will present in summary form four lines of argument against compatibilist free will.
  The first line is the appeal to intuition. Roughly, this amounts to the argument that our intuition takes causal necessity in any form as inimical to freedom and responsibility, and thus rules out compatibilism. The flip side of this is the argument that our intuition is strongly incompatibilist, and thus rules in libertarian free will as the obviously correct account of free will. The confidence of theologians, philosophers, and others who make use of this appeal to intuition is exhibited in their frequent references to libertarian free will as “genuine” or “significant.” By contrast, of course, compatibilist free will is dismissed frequently as unworthy of consideration.
  For libertarians who do take the time to consider carefully the claims of compatibilists, there is a second line of argument they find attractive, the problem of shallowness. According to this argument, compatibilism in fact
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 582
  describes a form of freedom human beings can have, a form that does ground some ascriptions of responsibility.20  Suppose that in a deterministic world there are two business partners, Joseph and Josephine. Joseph is lazy, and he devotes very little effort to his work, but Josephine works hard and over time makes a success of the business the two of them started together. Some libertarians maintain that even in a deterministic world agents who meet the requirements of contemporary compatibilism—and let’s assume Joseph and Josephine meet them—are in a sense responsible for their actions. There is a morally significant distinction between Joseph and Josephine, and the stipulated truth of determinism for their world cannot erase that distinction, even though it allows only for compatibilist free will. There is a sense in which both business partners are responsible agents, one of whom deserves praise for her work, and one of whom does not. Lest anyone think this is an argument for compatibilism, the libertarian says the following: “In their deterministic world Joseph and Josephine are free agents of a compatibilist sort, and this confers moral responsibility on them. But this responsibility is shallow because it looks no deeper than the motives and character of these two people. If we look more deeply, we will see that in a deterministic world a person’s character is just the unfolding of what that person was given, an unfolding that could not have turned out any differently. From a deep or ultimate perspective, Joseph and Josephine are not responsible agents.”
  The third and fourth lines of argument against compatibilism are variations on one theme. The third line is the consequence argument. Peter van Inwagen offers the following thumbnail sketch of it: “If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.”21  To say that something is “not up to us” is to say that we are not responsible for it; so determinism is incompatible with free will. The closely related fourth line of argument is the problem of remote deterministic luck. Alfred Mele sums it up in this passage:
      Compatibilism is also challenged by a kind of luck. Incompatibilists want to know how agents can be morally responsible for actions of theirs or perform them freely if, relative to their own powers of control, it is just a matter of luck that long before their birth their universe was such as to ensure that they would perform those actions. How, they want to know, is agents’ remote deterministic luck compatible with their exercising MR freedom-level control in acting?22
  Both the third and fourth lines of argument address an agent’s control over his choices, and both assume that the sort of control necessary for free will is precluded by determinism.
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 583
  And so there it is: both libertarian and compatibilist accounts of free will are subject to a number of serious objections that have not been conclusively refuted. Philosophers who work in free will theory are devoted to their favorite theories, and skilled at defending them. Alfred Mele testifies to this: “I have been immersed in this issue long enough to have learned that experienced incompatibilists—like experienced compatibilists—rarely are persuaded to climb over, or even onto, the fence.”23  Because of these things, the stalemate about free will persists, and it seems highly unlikely that it will be broken.
  3. Scripture and free will. Although the Bible contains no formal account of free will, it repeatedly asserts that human beings are morally responsible to God for the conduct of their lives. This is hardly a controversial claim, so I will make no attempt to defend it. Instead, I offer a representative sample of this biblical assertion and comment on its significance. In Revelation 16, seven angels pour out on the earth the seven bowls of the wrath of God. The third bowl turns rivers into blood, and an angel remarks, “Righteous art Thou, who art and who wast, O Holy One, because Thou didst judge these things; for they poured out the blood of saints and prophets and Thou hast given them blood to drink. They deserve it” (Rev 16:5–6 NASB). It is evident that John is neither offering an account of free will nor even asserting directly that human beings are morally responsible for their deeds; he is noting the appropriateness of this particular form of divine judgment: they had shed innocent blood, and now they will be made to drink blood. But behind the angel’s verdict (“They deserve it”) is the assumption that human beings are morally responsible to God for the conduct of their lives, an assumption that, as I have said, is repeatedly asserted in the Bible. In Revelation 20, John makes this assertion in his description of the final judgment at which everyone is judged according to their deeds (vv. 12–13).
  Given the clear biblical assertion of moral responsibility and the traditional use of the term “free will” to stand for whatever sort of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility, it follows that the Bible itself indirectly teaches that human beings have free will. But it does not follow that the Bible teaches—directly or indirectly—a particular account of free will. Biblical teaching supplies an implicit endorsement of free will, and nothing more. It is of no help in ending the long-standing philosophical stalemate about what account of free will is correct.
  Typically, biblical passages that touch on questions of human agency are susceptible both to compatibilist and libertarian readings, in part because the biblical writers are not addressing the sorts of things that sustain the stalemate about free will. This is another claim that is hardly controversial, not to anyone who has taken a careful look at what the Bible actually says, so I will not try to defend it. Instead, I will offer a representative sample of a biblical passage that is neutral with respect to the competing accounts
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 584
  of free will. In 2 Corinthians 8, Paul is writing about Titus, who has gone to Corinth to collect the offering for the needy believers in Judea. Paul writes, “But thanks be to God, who puts the same earnestness on your behalf in the heart of Titus. For he not only accepted our appeal, but being himself very earnest, he has gone to you of his own accord” (vv. 16–17 NASB). This passage can be given a classical compatibilist reading very easily. God implants earnestness in the heart of Titus, which results in his strongest desire being to go to the Corinthians, resulting in his going to them. And it can be given a libertarian reading with equal ease. Titus goes to the Corinthians of his own accord; that is, he had libertarian leeway, so he might have either accepted or resisted the divine prompting to care about the Corinthians. In the actual case, he accepts this prompting, which induces Paul to thank God (for the prompting) and to praise Titus (for responding to it “of his own accord”).
  Turning from particular passages to broad biblical themes will not help end the stalemate about free will. If, for instance, someone argues the biblical teaching about God as the ultimate and sovereign source of salvation (e.g. John 6, Romans 9) implies that human beings have compatibilist free will, someone else may reply that biblical teaching about the human reception of salvation and living of the Christian life (e.g. Hebrews 6; James 1) implies that we have some form of libertarian freedom.
  The upshot of all this is that the Bible underdetermines free will theory. No appeal to biblical teaching will settle the question of what sort of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility; the stalemate about free will remains.

    III. Agnostic Autonomism

  Recall that the DSF debate rests on two assumptions. The first is that we know what sort of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. And the second is that there appears to be reason to doubt that the existence and activity of a sovereign God is compatible with that sort of freedom. The persistence of the stalemate about free will gives us excellent grounds for rejecting the first assumption. And if we reject the first assumption, we must reject the second assumption as well, and so the case for the DSF debate collapses. We should, therefore, suspend the debate while we work on the logically prior problem of determining what it is about human beings that makes them morally responsible agents. Since suspending the DSF debate requires abandoning our previously held commitments to particular accounts of free will, it leaves us needing to adopt a new, possibly provisional, stance about the freedom necessary for moral responsibility. I call that stance agnostic autonomism, borrowing the term from Alfred Mele.24
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 585
  1. Description of agnostic autonomism. An agnostic autonomist believes in moral responsibility, and so also believes in the freedom or “autonomy” human beings must have in order to be moral agents. But, in addition, he takes the stalemate about free will seriously, and consequently is agnostic as to which theory of free will is the correct one. More specifically, the agnostic autonomist affirms Proposition D: For some of their actions human beings have the type and degree of control that is necessary and sufficient to ground ascriptions of deep moral responsibility. Proposition D requires clarification; I will comment on four of its features.
  First, Proposition D addresses some, but not all, human actions. This is in keeping with the commonly accepted view that we are morally responsible for the conduct of our lives but not always for all the acts we perform. Imagine the case of a man who drinks a beverage that, without his knowledge, has been laced with a mind-altering drug. If the man then commits a violent act due entirely to the effects of that drug, we would not regard him as morally responsible for the act.
  Second, Proposition D affirms a “control” that appears to be a broader concept than “free will” understood as “whatever sort of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility.” This is an important contrast. Consider the case of that man who innocently drinks a drug-laced beverage. We may assume that he had free will in choosing to drink, and free will (as we are using the term) is necessary, but not sufficient, for moral responsibility. The man freely chose to drink, but he did not know about the drug and so is not morally responsible for his subsequent violent behavior. In the language of Proposition D, he lacked the relevant control. As a necessary condition of moral responsibility, free will is a component of responsibility-grounding control; it is not the whole of it.
  Third, Proposition D affirms a form of control that grounds deep moral responsibility. The concept of moral responsibility is every bit as puzzling as free will, and it creates all sorts of intellectual disputes.25  Even with a statement as brief as Proposition D, the agnostic autonomist cannot entirely avoid those disputes. By speaking of deep moral responsibility, Proposition D commits the agnostic autonomist to the existence of a type of responsibility that can justify vigorous social institutions of praise and blame, punishment and reward. Competing, more “shallow” types of responsibility—e.g. the sort of responsibility some libertarians think compatibilism allows—will not justify all those institutions. For instance, an advocate of shallow or mild moral responsibility is likely to reject the death penalty.
  And fourth, Proposition D is neutral with respect to all the questions that divide participants in the free will stalemate. It offers no hints about the identity of “the type and degree of control” that grounds moral responsibility; as an expression of agnostic autonomism it could hardly do so.
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 586
  2. Theology and agnostic autonomism. Proposition D is a philosophical thesis that makes no reference to God or the Bible, but its content is consistent with biblical teaching. In fact, an agnostic autonomist who is a Christian has a biblical basis both for accepting Proposition D and for supplementing it with Proposition G: God guarantees that human beings meet the conditions that are necessary and sufficient to ground deep moral responsibility. That basis is belief in the justice of God. It cannot be that God, as the righteous judge, should hold us responsible for the conduct of our lives unless there are facts about us that justify his judgment. Whatever those facts may be, they are both necessary and sufficient to ground ascriptions of deep moral responsibility.
  In the context of a conservative theology that accepts at face value all of the Bible’s assertions, the “deep moral responsibility” of Proposition D and Proposition G is nothing less than “ultimate desert”—a form of responsibility so strong that it can justify consigning a person to hell for eternity. Even thinkers who reject the Christian faith recognize ultimate desert as the limiting case for accounts of moral responsibility, and typically they mention it to dismiss it as false or incoherent. For instance, philosopher Hilary Bok says she will not present a “conception of moral responsibility strong enough to justify eternal damnation or beatitude” and insists that no coherent conception of freedom and moral responsibility could justify such things.26
  Responses to deep moral responsibility as ultimate desert come in three forms. The first I have just mentioned: flat rejection. The second response is acceptance predicated on the affirmation of a particular account of free will. Let us call this “dogmatic autonomism.” And the third response is acceptance predicated on the affirmation of Proposition G without appeal to any particular account of free will. This, of course, is the response of the agnostic autonomist. Only the second and third responses are legitimate options for Christians who take the Bible seriously.
  Consider a theologian who is a dogmatic autonomist. He believes in deep moral responsibility as ultimate desert and believes he knows what sort of freedom is necessary for that moral responsibility. Furthermore, he can give a careful articulation of that “sort of freedom,” whether he supposes it to be libertarian or compatibilist. There is something else that may well be true about him: he may find himself uneasy about the doctrine of hell. This is common enough, but it is surprising for a sincere dogmatic autonomist. Why? Because, besides his belief that God through Christ offers eternal salvation, the dogmatic autonomist believes that he knows what it is about human beings that justifies God in consigning them to hell. At least on intellectual grounds, the theologian who is a sincere dogmatic autonomist should not be uneasy about his belief in hell.
  Now consider a theologian who is an agnostic autonomist. He believes in deep moral responsibility as ultimate desert, but he believes that he does
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 587
  not know what sort of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. He is impressed by the philosophical stalemate about free will, and he finds the concept of moral responsibility to be perplexing. As implications of his faith, he accepts both Proposition D and Proposition G, believing that God knows what it is about human beings that justifies treating them as moral agents who deserve an eternal hell. There is something else that may be true about him: he may find himself uneasy about the doctrine of hell. Again, this is common enough, but it is not surprising for an agnostic autonomist. Why? Because as far as he can tell on intellectual grounds, deep moral responsibility as ultimate desert is highly unlikely. He has no arguments to offer skeptics like Hilary Bok; he is not able to explain how God could ever be just in sending anyone to an eternal hell. As an agnostic autonomist, he cannot appeal to a particular account of free will to sustain even a modest form of moral responsibility, much less the deep moral responsibility of Proposition D and Proposition G. Given the limits of his intellectual position, the theologian who is an agnostic autonomist may well feel uneasy about his belief in hell.
  The contrast between these two theologians is instructive. It shows us that agnostic autonomism makes much better sense than dogmatic autonomism in explaining the experience of uneasiness about the doctrine of hell. This is a point in favor of agnostic autonomism, the stance of those who advocate suspending the DSF debate in which dogmatic autonomists frequently participate. And this contrast also gives us reason to doubt the first assumption of the DSF debate, namely, that we know what sort of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. For if we did know this, why would we be uneasy (intellectually) about the doctrine of hell? Dogmatic autonomists say they have this knowledge of free will, but they sometimes are uneasy about the doctrine of hell.
  There is a possible rejoinder by the dogmatic autonomists, and it, too, is instructive. Again consider our theologian who is a dogmatic autonomist and who is uneasy about the doctrine of hell. If he modifies my original description of dogmatic autonomism, this theologian may say that we do know what sort of freedom is necessary for ordinary ascriptions of moral responsibility among human beings, but that we do not know—at least not fully—what it is about us that grounds ascriptions of deep moral responsibility, the “ultimate desert” implied by the doctrine of hell. Therefore, he says, it makes sense that even dogmatic autonomists can be uneasy about this most difficult of Christian beliefs.
  Why is this instructive? It shows us that the dogmatic autonomists have a dilemma. Either (1) they claim to know only what sort of freedom is necessary for ordinary ascriptions of moral responsibility or (2) they claim to know whatever it is about human beings that grounds ascriptions of deep moral responsibility and thereby justifies hell. If they opt for (1), they lose much of the motivation for the DSF debate. Participants in the debate worry about whether the existence of a sovereign (omnipotent and omniscient) God is compatible with human beings having the sort of freedom that would justify
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 588
  this God in holding them morally responsible for their lives.27  And, of course, God’s holding them responsible is clearly the paradigm of deep moral responsibility. If they opt for (2), dogmatic autonomists retain the problem of explaining the uneasiness some of them feel about the doctrine of hell.
  Agnostic autonomism appears to be the better choice for a stance about freedom and moral responsibility. It is a rational response to the philosophical stalemate about free will, and it makes good sense of our intellectual discomfort with the doctrine of hell. But it is only a stance, not a project. It is useful as a stance—an intellectual posture—to take while engaging in an attempt to solve the problem that is logically prior to the DSF debate, namely, the problem of determining what it is about human beings that justifies God in holding them morally responsible for the conduct of their lives.

    IV. Attempting To End The Stalemate

  Perhaps the place to begin in working on this problem is to distinguish two senses of “ending the stalemate” about free will. In the first sense, we achieve a consensus in favor of one of the two species of free will theory (libertarian and compatibilist). In this first sense, “ending the stalemate” will not be sufficient to justify our resuming the DSF debate. Why? Because all it will give us is the sort of freedom that is necessary for ordinary ascriptions of moral responsibility. Participants in the DSF debate need to know what is necessary and sufficient for deep moral responsibility. In the second sense, then, “ending the stalemate” is the creation of a consensus about the conditions for deep moral responsibility, which will be a specification of the “control” affirmed by Proposition D.
  A consensus about the conditions for deep moral responsibility must feature a list of those conditions. Let us call this an “R-List” (“R” for responsibility). R-Lists figure prominently in the work of philosophers, especially those who are compatibilists. Although not a compatibilist himself, Richard Double has developed a compatibilist R-List of five conditions: self-knowledge, reasonability, intelligence, efficacy, and unity.28  A free and responsible agent will meet all five conditions; for instance, he will have the first, self-knowledge—a good grasp of his beliefs, desires, and other mental states—so that he will be free of ignorance and self-deception when making his choices. Each of the conditions makes some contribution to the case for attributing moral responsibility to an agent.
  An agnostic autonomist who wishes to resume the DSF debate must work to develop an R-List that includes more than the sorts of conditions Double places on his list. This is because a Christian thinker (in this case our agnostic autonomist) believes that deep moral responsibility is only possible in the real world, that is, the world in which every moral agent is ultimately accountable
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 589
  to God. So the correct R-List will contain more epistemic conditions than Double’s requirement that responsible agents have self-knowledge. It will include, for instance, at least tacit knowledge of God’s existence (Romans 1) and some knowledge of God’s moral law (Romans 2). In other words, the agnostic autonomist wants an R-List that requires us to know to whom and for what we are deeply responsible. And given the complexity of any discussion of moral responsibility, the correct R-List is likely to contain a good number of additional conditions.
  As he develops his R-List, the agnostic autonomist should test each of its components, and the list itself, in a variety of ways. These include tests for logical coherence, consistency with biblical teaching, and agreement with common moral intuitions. And finally, he should submit his R-List to others for their critical review. If a number of agnostic autonomists worked on this project, it is possible that in time they would have a consensus about the conditions for deep moral responsibility.
  If such a consensus were achieved, agnostic autonomists would thereby shed their agnosticism and become dogmatic autonomists, prepared to resume the DSF debate. They would then ask whether anything about the sovereignty (omnipotence and omniscience) of God appears to rule out human beings meeting the conditions for deep moral responsibility. If the answer is in the affirmative, they would then undertake projects to reconcile these two lines of Christian belief. Disputing the merits of these reconciliation projects would constitute the new DSF debate.

    V. An Appeal To Dogmatic Autonomists

  Most Christian thinkers with conservative theological views are dogmatic autonomists who are unlikely to be impressed by the philosophical stalemate about free will. They are likely to remain satisfied with their favorite libertarian and compatibilist accounts of free will, and will refuse to abandon them when told that doing so is a prerequisite for gaining a fuller understanding of deep moral responsibility. The libertarians among them will see libertarianism as naturally or obviously true, and many of the compatibilists will insist that compatibilism is a logical implication of the sovereignty of God. In what follows I argue that even dogmatic autonomists should suspend the DSF debate to work on the logically prior problem of determining what it is about human beings that justifies God holding them morally responsible for the conduct of their lives. I will show that dogmatic autonomists should join agnostic autonomists in the search for the conditions that ground deep moral responsibility.
  Suppose that some form of libertarian freedom is the correct account of free will (the freedom necessary for moral responsibility). And suppose further that God refrains from determining what our choices shall be. Does it follow that we have deep moral responsibility for the conduct of our lives, and that God is justified in consigning us to an eternal hell? No. The fact that God does not control our choices does not guarantee that we have control over them, much less the sort of control that would make us deeply responsible for
  JETS 51:3 (September 2008) p. 590
  them. All a particular libertarian account of free will gives us is a necessary condition for ordinary ascriptions of moral responsibility. To justify hell, we will need an R-List that supplements the “libertarian free will condition” with a number of additional conditions that are necessary and jointly sufficient to ground ascriptions of deep moral responsibility. Therefore, dogmatic autonomists who are libertarians should suspend their participation in the DSF debate, and join agnostic autonomists in the search for a full account of the conditions for deep moral responsibility.
  Suppose instead that some form of compatibilist freedom is the correct account of free will. In that case, theological determinists can assert both that God determines all things, including our choices, and that we have free will. But given these beliefs, can we conclude that human beings have deep moral responsibility and are thereby fit candidates for an eternal hell? No. Simply to assert that a deterministic version of divine sovereignty is compatible with human freedom fails to supply us with a full account of the conditions for deep moral responsibility. We cannot turn to classical compatibilism, since it is no longer philosophically tenable, and we will find that contemporary versions of compatibilism are “works in progress” that continue to be viewed with skepticism by those who doubt that any form of compatibilism could ever give us more than a shallow form of moral responsibility. So what compatibilists need is an R-List that is free from the flaws of classical compatibilism and will not easily be overturned by libertarian charges of shallowness. Since, then, they are not yet prepared to explain what it is about human beings that justifies God in holding them deeply responsible, dogmatic autonomists who are compatibilists should suspend their participation in the DSF debate. They may then join libertarians and agnostic autonomists in an effort to provide a full account of the conditions for deep moral responsibility.

    V. Conclusion

  The long-standing debate about divine sovereignty and human freedom rests on the assumption that we know what sort of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. A careful consideration of the philosophical stalemate about free will and the Bible’s underdetermination of free will theory should make us reject that assumption and lead us to suspend the debate. We thereby become agnostic autonomists, and proceed to engage in a search for the conditions that ground not only ordinary ascriptions of moral responsibility, but the deep moral responsibility that justifies consigning human beings to hell. And, as I have argued, even if we remain dogmatic autonomists we have good reasons to suspend the debate and join the agnostic autonomists in their search.
  However protracted our search, we may never have a full account of the conditions for deep moral responsibility. We can, all the same, rest confident that God knows those conditions. Because he knows them and is loving and just, we can affirm Proposition G: God guarantees that human beings meet the conditions that are necessary and sufficient to ground deep moral responsibility.


David M. Ciocci, Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society Volume 51, 3 (Lynchburg, VA: Evangelical Theological Society, 2008), 572-90.

THE THEOLOGY OF PREACHING

A THEOLOGY OF PREACHING

INTRODUCTION:

            This paper fulfills an assigned task to write an evangelical theology of preaching. Within its introductory remarks, a presuppositional basis and biblical definition of preaching are presented. As the foundation of a building is essential to the strength and stability of that structure, foundational principles provide the needed support for effective theology. The stating of this basis and definition identifies that needed foundation. It is the thesis of this paper that a sufficient evangelical theology of preaching is established by identifying and reviewing three essential elements of that theology: 1) the man who preaches, 2) the message he preaches and 3) the mission or purpose of preaching. This thesis further asserts that the proper comprehension and implementation of these three elements will begin with an acceptance of the values and truths stated in the presuppositional basis and biblical definition which follow.

The Presuppositional Basis

            As stated above any theologian seeking to propose an evangelical theology should identify and justify the foundational principles upon which his view is based. His theology of preaching is no exception. Thus, since this project is tasked to present such a theology, the foundational presuppositions upon which it is to be based are as follows: 1) there is only one true and living God and He is eternal, a-temporal, holy, perfect in wisdom, complete in knowledge, absolute in authority, almighty in power, spotless in righteousness, blameless in all His ways and just in all His judgments. He is also all-sufficient in grace, everlasting in love and enduring in His mercy. 2) God has revealed Himself to be a triune being through the person of the Father, the person of the Son and the person of the Holy Spirit. This revelation has taken place through creation and other works as recorded in the Old and New Testaments and His coming in the flesh in the person of Jesus Christ. By means of the Holy Spirit’s guidance, He continues to reveal Himself, His purposes and His ways to mankind through the pages of the inerrant Scripture. 3) Because of sin, man fell from his original, intended place in God’s creation. Jesus, the Son, revealed God’s eternal plan for man’s redemption and restoration to that former, intended place by coming as God in the flesh, presenting Himself as a sacrificial offering of substitution thus providing the atonement for man’s sin and failure. 4) The success of His atonement and completed victory over sin, death, hell and the grave, as illustrated by His bodily resurrection from the dead, has significant present and eternal potential for mankind. This potential constitutes the “good news,” or, the Gospel. 5) God desires for all to surrender themselves to the work and person of Jesus Christ, and by so doing receive the gift of His redeeming grace through faith. He desires those who have received this gift of redemption to share this gospel with every man of every nation until Christ’s promised return. 6) As a primary means of accomplishing that calling, God has tasked certain men to preach this gospel to all creation so as to evangelize the lost, and equip God’s people in their journey of faith until all have reached a point of spiritual maturity. God intends this to be done through the proclamation and instruction of the truths of His Word. Therefore, God continues to reveal Himself, His purposes and His ways through all His followers and to all His followers, but specifically He uses those who have been selected by Him to preach His message. He has chosen preaching to be the primary and an essential means by which this message is to be revealed and His will to be declared.

            Preaching, therefore, is a concept of God’s design and, as a result, should be considered a holy privilege and an act of worship and obedience having a potential for eternal as well as immediate consequences. These six propositions assume that any theology of preaching built upon something contrary to these propositions is neither sufficient nor justified to be called evangelical or biblical. Thus, any preaching not built upon them would not be worthy of the label.[1]

The Definition of Preaching

      Preaching has been defined in so many ways, one could get lost in the research. Secular sources define the term negatively by identifying it as an exhortation done in an “officious or tiresome manner.”[2] Christian sources, on the other hand, consider preaching to be “the delivery of a learned and edifying or hortatory discourse in well-chosen words and a pleasant voice.”[3] More recent definitions include: “Christian preaching . . . is the event of God bringing to an audience a Bible-based, Christ-related, life-impacting message of instruction and direction from himself through the words of a spokesperson.”^[4] These statements only begin to reveal the wide spectrum of definitions for consideration.

            Whatever diversity of definition given to the term preaching, this project presents a biblically justifiable one. This is possible in spite of the fact that the Bible does not specifically define the term. There are a number of Greek terms within the manuscripts which sufficiently describing the preaching event. These are used as to justify the assertions within the thesis of this paper. Two such terms are of major significance. They are kerusso and euangelizo. These terms, and some of their derived forms, comprise the vast majority of the instances where some form of the English word preach is used to translate. Hence, understanding these two terms will provide a sufficient foundation for formulating a correct perception of what the Bible writers intended the reader to comprehend when they used these terms.

            The first term, the Greek verb kerusso and its noun form kerugma, carry the act of an official proclamation (the verb) or an official message (the noun). It represents the idea of communicating official or important information with the implication that some kind of response should take place.[5] If, for instance, a town crier of the first century was tasked by the government to proclaim the news that enemy forces were approaching and appropriate actions are expected by the general populace, the action of proclaiming this message would be described by this verb and message proclaimed by the noun. Similarly, if the town crier were to proclaim that a new tax was to be implemented those implementing the tax would expect those hearing the proclamation to understand and respond accordingly. The action of the crier and the message he proclaimed illustrates the meaning of verb and noun of this Greek term, respectively. It was this word, and its variant forms, which was borrowed by the writers of the New Testament to represent the intended action and message of the biblical preacher. Thus, the biblical preacher is to be seen as an official messenger of God with an official, important message from Him and, as in the case of the examples given above, upon his proclaiming, there is an expectation of appropriate response.

            The second term, the Greek verb euangelizo, represents the sharing of joyous news or news that should cause its hearer to rejoice.  The noun is literally a compilation of the Greek terms translated good and message or news.[6]  Hence, in its noun form, the word euangelion is translated Gospel, or good news. Thus, the sharing of this good news is the force of the verb.  When both terms are combined to identify the preaching dynamic, one can easily see that the biblical concept of preaching is the sharing of the Good News in an official capacity as one who carries the message of God to those who need to hear it that they might respond appropriately. This then is a beginning for understanding of what biblical preaching is or should be. However, identifying what preaching is does not establish a theology of preaching. It merely serves to help identify the target. To establish such a theology requires consideration of the entire preaching dynamic. That requires the identification and review of the three essential elements which comprise a biblical theology of preaching.

IDENTITY AND REVIEW OF THE THREE ESSENTIAL

ELEMENTS OF A THEOLOGY OF PREACHING

            Having revealed the foundations upon which this theology is built, the focus turns to that which constitutes the structure of the theology of preaching. The question now to be addressed is, “What comprises the essential elements for constructing a meaningful theology of preaching?” The thesis of this paper states that there are three such elements.

            The first can be found in Romans 10:14. There, Paul asks the rhetorical question, “How shall they hear without a preacher?” This establishes that the first essential element of a biblical theology of preaching is a preacher. Thus, the consideration of what is expected of these God-appointed preachers will be significant. In 1 Corinthians 1:17, Paul reveals another essential element when he describes that he was sent to “preach the Gospel.” This establishes that the second element is that which is preached. Thus, understanding what constitutes this message and how the preacher can be certain he is preaching what God intends is another essential for a biblical theology of  preaching.

            The third essential element is again revealed by Paul in Colossians 1:28-29. In these verses, Paul declares that the ultimate aim of his proclaiming (preaching)[7] is “warning and teaching everyone with all wisdom that we may present everyone (spiritually) mature.” By this statement, Paul establishes not only that preaching must have a mission or purpose but that it has a specific mission or purpose. Subsequently, a theology of preaching must be able to identify and justify the purpose for preaching.

            Though these three ingredients may not be all-inclusive of that which fully comprises the biblical preaching dynamic, a succinct but adequate discussion of these three essential elements, built upon the foundational principles already stated, is sufficient for a responsible and biblically sound theology of preaching. Identifying and reviewing these three essential elements, therefore, will sufficiently fulfill the assigned task.

The Man Who Preaches

            Paul makes it clear that God’s plan requires the message of God’s redemption to be proclaimed by preachers when he poses the rhetorical question, “But how can they call on Him they have not believed in? And how can they believe without hearing about Him? And how can they hear without a preacher (Romans 10:14 HCSB)?” These questions suggest that not all men are to be preachers, but all preachers are to be extraordinary men. They must be extraordinary because while they are yet subject to the weaknesses of the flesh, they are tasked to do work that is holy, the proclaiming of God’s message. J.I. Packer describes the preaching event as when: “The preacher is treating himself as a mouthpiece for the biblical word of God, and that word is coming through.”^[8] In one of his sermons entitled, The Care of the Soul Urged as the One Thing Needed, George Whitefield wrote:

The care of the soul, implies a readiness to hear the words of Christ, to seat ourselves with Mary at his feet, and to receive both the law and the gospel from his mouth. It supposes, that we learn from this divine teacher the worth of our souls, their danger, and their remedy; and that we become above all things solicitous about their salvation. That, heartily repenting of all our sins, and cordially believing the everlasting gospel, we receive the Lord Jesus Christ for righteousness and life, rest our souls on the value of his atonement, and the efficacy of his grace.^[9]           

            While Whitefield is not specifically addressing preachers in this quote, it is self-evident that if these principles are applicable to the person in the pew, they must be even more applicable to the man in the pulpit. Biblical preaching is to be executed by men who have been called of God to perform the task. “How shall they hear without a preacher?” makes this clear. However, in the next verse, there is even more evidence that this must be a person specifically tasked with this duty, “And how can they preach unless they are sent (Romans 10:15 HCSB)? These verses force the following questions: “Is it biblical preaching if it is not done by one the Father has not called to preach?  Is it biblical preaching if it is done by a preacher seeking the attention of man rather that pointing the attention of man to the message of God?"

            The thesis of this paper suggests that these questions are to be answered negatively. The man must not only be called to preach the message but he must live a life that reflects the validity of the message he preaches. This is one of the primary points Paul is making. The quote of Whitefield above affirms this by offering a focus that is three-fold. He speaks of concern for the inward focus of the child of God as he speaks of the “care of the soul.” He speaks of his outward focus in that he speaks of the essential concern for being “solicitous” of the salvation of the lost. Lastly, he focuses upon the preacher’s upward focus in that he challenges the reader to rest in the “value of his atonement and the efficacy of his grace.” It is obvious that these are to be the foci of the children of God. Consequently, they must be the foci of the biblical preacher. It is inconceivable that the biblical preacher could effectively preach to others of truths he himself does not know nor experienced or possessed? Thus, these focal points must be central to the man who preaches. For this reason, a closer look at these three points of focus, as they relate to the man who preaches, is in order if one is going to establish a sufficient theology of preaching.

His Upward Focus

            Charles Simeon said of the preacher: “A servant of God should never lose sight of the object which he is commissioned to promote. Whether in public or in private, whether on the Sabbath or other days, whether early or late, whether in a season of peace or of the bitterest persecution, he should be alike active, and alike intent on fulfilling the will of his Divine Master”^[10] What Simeon is confirmed is that the upward focus of the preacher ought to be on his Master as a servant who seeks to know his Master’s will. As a faithful servant his focus is on doing that which brings his master pleasure. This upward focus requires certain knowledge of God and of the Word of God which enables and results in his ever growing intimacy with his heavenly Father. As one who serves his Lord, the man who preaches must understand that his primary focus is not the pleasure of man, nor even the pleasure of himself. Though preaching may bring much personal pleasure, the primary focus must be the pleasure of God. His focus must always be upward if he is to be God’s messenger.

           

His Inner Focus

            Simeon speaks also of the need of an inner focus as he describes the truth about some who enjoy preaching but do not heed its message, “there are many professors of religion who are as much under the dominion of unhallowed tempers as if they were utter strangers to divine truth: and, in speaking peace to themselves, they fearfully deceive their own souls: for, whatever they may think, their religion is altogether vain.”^[11] Thus, the man who preaches must look within himself that he might know his potential for weakness as well as knowing that within him he possesses the truth of the Gospel and the presence of the Holy Spirit and the joy of real salvation. He must look within himself in such a way that he sincerely lives as though he believes what he has been tasked to preach. To live otherwise would negate his capacity to be a spokesman for God. This was confirmed by Paul when he wrote, “I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection: lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway (1 Corinthians 9:27 (KJV).” Packer expands this thought when he correctly observes, “We need the unction of the Holy Spirit for the act of preaching itself.”^[12] How can this unction be free to work if the inner man is out of focus within? Again, Simeon exhorted, “Grievous have been the falls of many who have professed religion; and shocking the scandals which have at times prevailed in the Christian Church.”^[13] William Ward Ayer further confirms the need of this focus, “Whatever the sermonic style, the pulpiteer is effective when he has the highest spiritual motive. This includes the conscious call of God to preach.”[14] All of this leads to an obvious conclusion: If the man of God is to preach the message of God, he must be possessed by the person of God and a heart which yearns for God. This requires his inner focus be consumed with a desire for an ever deepening knowledge of God and His pleasure and a certainty of his call to preach.

His Outward Focus

        Finally, Simeon mentions the need for a sufficient outward focus of the man who preaches. The outward focus involves two points of concentration. First, he is called to regard those to whom he preaches. J.I. Packer points out, “Without a regular diet of Bible-based, Christ-related, life-impacting messages from God, the mindset of a congregation will become . . . institutionalist and sacramentalist.”^[15] The man who preaches must possess a concern for those of the flock that such a mindset not beset them. Thus the man who preaches must focus on his responsibilities to the children of God. This requires a concern for the needs of the flock of God that seeks to offer what is required for the flock as defined by the Father, not just what is requested or preferred by them. Secondly, Simeon declares the man who preaches to be “appointed of God to instruct the world in the things which belong to their everlasting peace. ‎They are to rescue men, if possible, from the power of Satan . . . ‎ But their only hope of success is in God alone.[16]” Thus, the man who preaches must include in his outward focus his responsibilities to preach the truths of God to those who do not know the Lord’s redemption. This responsibility to faithfully preach the Gospel to the lost must also be part of the outward focus of the man who preaches. This is to be done however, not with a self-reliance which impedes the work of God but with reliance upon the power of the Spirit of God. The results of all biblical preaching must be entrusted to the Holy Spirit.

Summary Thoughts

            These three foci aid in identifying the role of the man who preaches and his significance within a theology of preaching. Further development of these foci is warranted but due to the limits of this project, a fuller development is not possible here. To summarize what has been presented thus far, preaching is an essential part of God’s plan for disseminating the truths of His Word. Preaching requires a preacher called by God to the task and sufficiently focused upwardly, inwardly and outwardly so as to assure his effectiveness as a preacher. Having established the first element of a theology of preaching, attention is now directed toward the second.

The Message to Be Preached

            There are many biblical references for what is to be preached. The examples given by the Greek terms which appear in the introduction are exemplars. Further reference is found in Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians. There, the Apostle speaks of his calling. He states, “For Christ did not send me to baptize but to preach the gospel, and not with words of eloquent wisdom, lest the cross of Christ be emptied of its power (1 Corinthians 1:17 ESV).” If one understands the gospel to be the good news of the death burial and resurrection of the Lord Jesus and what those truths mean for those who believe, both for their present and their eternity as has been previously established, then it is clear that the preaching of the Gospel would require a preaching of the whole Word of God. Paul further implies this to be the case in his letter to the young Timothy, “I charge you in the presence of God and of Christ Jesus, who is to judge the living and the dead, and by his appearing and his kingdom: preach the word; be ready in season and out of season; reprove, rebuke, and exhort, with complete patience and teaching (2 Timothy 4:1–2 ESV). Though these verses may not present a thorough understanding of the message to be preached, they do establish clear indicators of the priority of preaching. To more fully comprehend the parameters of the message to be preached, proposed ideological indicators will be discussed. By these a sufficient understanding is attained to provide sufficient clarity of the message. Succinctly, it is the position of this paper that an adequate theology of preaching requires an adequate identification of the message to be preached. To properly identify that message, an adequate theology of preaching will reflect: 1) a philosophy that is propositional, 2) a Scripture that is revelational, 3) an exegesis that is justifiable, 4) a homiletic that is intentional and 5) a rhetoric that is effectual. Each of these concepts are defined and discussed in further detail below.

A Philosophy that is Propositional

            As one of, if not the primary evangelical theologian of the 20^th century, Carl F. H. Henry stated, “To be sure, concepts and words are instrumentalities of God’s disclosure; divine revelation is conceptual and verbal. But neither a concept per se nor an unrelated word can be true or false. Only propositions have the quality of truth.”[17] In this statement, Henry affirms that if the message to be preached is to be the truth God intended, it must be preached as a philosophical truth which is propositional. That is, truth is not based on the perception of the perceiver, nor is truth the result of what man declares it to be. Truth is an eternal, unchangeable proposition which must be discovered, not created or devised. Thus, if the message preached is to be God’s message, it must be philosophically propositional.[18] Though some theologians today want to move away from propositionalism, they realize they cannot move away from propositional truth. Kevin Vanhoozer affirmed this when he wrote in The Drama of Doctrine, of his desire to move, “beyond propositionalism without, however, leaving propositions behind.”[19] Whatever Vanhoozer meant by that statement it is clear that he realizes he cannot fully abandon the reality that the Scriptures must be seen as propositional truth. Thus, any adequate theology of preaching must accept the message of God as being philosophically propositional.

A Scripture that is Revelational

            Though the message to be preached is philosophically propositional, Scripture itself is revelational in its intent. Carl Henry affirms this when he observes that there are but two alternatives for discerning truth. Either man projects himself upon the world and disavows any objective possibility of God or a “transcendent divine reality through intelligible revelation establishes the fact that God is actually at work in the sphere of nature and human affairs.”^[20] What is ironic is that both of these alternatives require a measure of faith. The first alternative, disavowing any object possibility of God, requires a significant measure of faith in man. The second requires a measure of faith in the transcendent reality of God. If a preacher is to preach God’s message, he cannot hold to the first. He must hold to the second. In so doing, he acknowledges that through creation and history, especially by the incarnation of Christ, and, today, primarily through the Scripture in concert with the work of the Holy Spirit, God has been and is revealing himself, his purposes and his ways to mankind. Hence, any message preached must reflect a Scripture that is revelational. God’s desire to reveal himself is self-evident throughout the pages of the Bible. As David Allen observed, “God’s words are inseparable from his self-revelation.”[21] Hence, if the message preached is to be God’s message from God’s Word, it will view Scripture as revelational.

An Exegesis that is Justifiable

            To understand the need for the message to reflect an exegesis that is justifiable, one must first be clear about what exegesis is. Succinctly, using language skills such as grammar, etymology and syntax etc., while being sensitive to the historical and literary context in which the passage was written, the exegete asks the question, “What does this passage of Scripture say?” This implies that though there may be a myriad of potential applications. There is only one justifiable translation of the text. The exegete seeks to discover what that is. Allen Myers affirmed this when he stated, “In the most basic sense, exegesis is concerned with the meaning of a text as regards the author and ancient addressees.”^[22] Hence, if the message preached is to be true to the Scriptures, it must be discovered by an exegesis that is justifiable. One must not approach Scripture with the notion that the Scripture is a tool for proving one’s point. Instead, one must approach the Scripture with honest, sufficient, and consistent academics so as to discover what the Scripture states. Otherwise one reads into the Scripture what is desired rather than receive from the Scripture what is stated. To read into the Scripture is eisegesis. To receive from the Scripture what is intended, is exegesis. The theological errors arising from eisegesis are too numerous to mention and as a result there are a broad spectrum of ideologies at work today. Many of these ideologies incorrectly claim to have biblical foundations because they come from what has been read into the text not what has been derived from text through justifiable exegesis. To confront this phenomenon, William Ayer suggests a review of the sermons preached in the 18^th and 19^th Centuries. Of those sermons he noted, “You will sense that while people were not as broadly intelligent concerning world affairs as today’s audiences, yet they had philosophical depth; and strong arguments were needed to keep them on the gospel road.”[23] The parallels to the present culture are obvious. Strong arguments are still needed and are best made by discovering and affirming what the text says, not what men want the text to say. Suffice it to say that assuring the message preached is indeed the message which God intended makes a strong case for accuracy. That kind of accuracy can only be the result of an exegesis that is justifiable. An exegesis that is justifiable will require sufficient and honest academics and consistency of translation which affirms non-contradiction within Scripture.

A Homiletic that is Intentional

            In regard to Homiletics, William Ward Ayer once again gives helpful insight for understanding, “Homiletics asks, ‘How am I going to relate what it says?’”[24] That is to say that while exegesis discovers what the passage says, homiletics seeks to determine how best to communicate or relate what the passage says to the hearer. Thus, homiletics must be intentional. This is confirmed by Ward’s statement, “you are not simply discovering what the passage says but there is an intention in declaring the passage and you develop the message to move the hearer toward that intention.”[25] Hence, “How is the sermon to be structured so as to best accomplish the biblical intention?” is the homiletical question and its place is vital in determining the content of the message preached. Ayer further comments, “Sermons should stabilize listeners to know that Christianity is a virile faith. It does not deal with old wives’ fables but with eternal certainties.”[26] Therefore, to communicate eternal certainties effectively does not require a homiletic that is accidental or undefined, but one that is intentional. The homiletics of that preacher who seeks to present a biblical theology should, therefore, be intentional. Having established that the message must be Scriptural which requires an exegesis that is faithful to what the Scripture says, it is now apparent that the homiletics of that message must be sufficiently intentional so as to “move the hearer toward that intention.” Thus, a homiletic that is intentional must be a function of the message preached if that message is to contribute to a theology of preaching.

A Rhetoric that is Effectual

            The final characteristic to be discussed regarding the message preached has to do with the rhetoric of the message. Though the term rhetoric is defined n a multitude of ways, it was initially used to define that part of the argument used by ancient philosophers who sought to respond to the dialectic or the initial presentation of a point or argument.^[27] Ayer assists us in understanding the validity of its use in reference to the message preached, “Rhetoric asks, how do I convince them of what is being said and convince them of what they should do?”[28] In other words, the man who preaches must assume that the hearer has heard at least some argument opposing the truths of the Scripture and the message he preaches must possess a rhetoric that is effectual in convincing the hearer of the Scriptural truth. Several thoughts emerge from this observation. First, the man who preaches must not make the mistake of assuming his hearers agree with the truths of Scripture. Second, the man who preaches must preach a message that is built upon certainties that can be justifiably claimed. Thirdly, the message preached must have as its goal, not only a convincing of the justifiability of the tenets upon which it is based but must possess a rhetoric that is effectual in moving the hearer toward compliance with the truth being preached. Thus, any theology of preaching must identify a message preached that is rhetorically effectual.

Summary Thoughts

            Not only must a sufficient theology of preaching include a description of the man who preaches, but it must include an sufficient understanding of the message to be preached. It is essential that this message reflect a philosophy that is propositional, a Scripture that is revelational, an exegesis that is justifiable, a homiletic that is intentional and a rhetoric that is effectual as the concept of rhetoric has herein been defined. These statements summaries are the first two essential elements of the theology of preaching. The third and final element is the mission or purpose of preaching.

The Mission of Preaching

            Stated simply, the mission of preaching is found by answering the question, “Why preach?” Paul’s stated purpose for preaching provides an excellent answer. A careful consideration of Colossians 1:28-29 reveals that statement. In those verses he declares, “²⁸ Him [Jesus] we proclaim, warning everyone and teaching everyone with all wisdom, that we may present everyone mature in Christ. ²⁹ For this I toil, struggling with all his energy that he powerfully works within me” (Colossians 1:28–29 ESV). First, it is important to recognize that the term translated proclaim is the Greek word kataggellw. It is a variant of euaggellizw   mentioned in the introduction. According to Louw Nida, this word means, “to announce, with focus upon the extent to which the announcement or proclamation extends—to proclaim throughout, to announce, to speak out about.”^[29] Parenthetically, this term is synonymous with khrussw also mentioned earlier but not the same. Khrussw suggests an ‘official’ quality of the announcement or proclamation.[30] Kataggellw suggests a wide-spread dissemination of the announcement or proclamation. Paul uses kataggellw to imply the extent of his preaching and proclaiming of the Gospel. In so doing he clearly identifies his widespread preaching to be a means by which he intends to accomplish his mission. Hence, these verses are being used to describe the purpose of Paul’s ministry but specifically the purpose or mission of his preaching.      The focal point in these verses is his declaration that everything Paul does contributes to the singular goal of presenting “everyone.” However, he is not merely concerned with the quantity of those presented. His mission is specifically to present everyone with lives that possess the quality of “maturity in Christ.”

            This word translated maturity also bears some scrutiny in that its understanding is critical for a full comprehension of Paul’s mission. The word is the noun teleioV. The verbal form of this noun is telew. A form of the verb was used by Jesus when he cried “it is finished” on the cross. Baur, Danker and Arndt’s lexicon describes the force of the word’s meaning as, “being mature, full-grown, mature, adult, or attaining an end or purpose, complete”^[31] This suggests that Jesus considered his work on the cross to be the completed fulfillment of his responsibility in his earthly life. Applying this force to Paul’s statement reveals that Paul was seeking to present everyone spiritually complete, or mature, as having attained their end or purpose. This, then, is clearly a reference to the quality of their spiritual life. He was not only interested in the quantity of souls, as revealed by his use of “everyone”; he was equally committed to presenting everyone with a quality of complete spiritual maturity. Thus, to state the obvious, that Paul preached with a certain expectation of results is doubtless.

            The question this raises is, “How does all this information assist in identifying the legitimate expectations for preaching the message?” As one considers Paul’s declaration of his mission, in Colossians 1, as noted above, several things become apparent. First, there is an expectation of repentance. Second, there is an expectation of regeneration. Third, there is an expectation of reclamation. Finally, there is an expectation of renewal. The final section of this paper will justify and review these four expectations. In so doing the mission or purpose of the message preached will be identified.

An Expectation of Repentance

            To justify the claim that repentance is a legitimate expectation of preaching is not difficult. First, because Paul’s mission is to present everyone who hears his message as spiritually mature, it is obvious that to begin the process toward that spiritual maturity the hearer of the message must first experience the new birth. The truth that to be a child of God requires being born again is a concept about which there is no uncertainty. Jesus’ statement as recorded in John 3:3 makes this apparent, “Jesus replied, “I assure you: Unless someone is born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God (HCSB).”

            To become born again requires repentance. This is made obvious by both Jesus and Paul. Jesus affirms it in Luke 13:3. “[B]ut unless you repent, you will all perish as well!” (Luke 13:3 (HCSB). Darrell Block’s commentary on this passage explains, “Only repentance will prevent the death that lasts. The comparison is between dying tragically in this life and perishing ultimately before God. Without a change of view about Jesus, a black cloud of death hovers over all.”^[32] Clearly, that preaching, according to Jesus, must possess a certain expectation of repentance.

            Having established Paul’s understanding of the purpose of preaching was to “present every person spiritually mature,” Paul further confirms repentance to be an expectation of this purpose is found in the self-description of his ministry as recorded in Acts 20: 21, “I testified to both Jews and Greeks about repentance toward God and faith in our Lord Jesus.” Paul herein underlines the essential nature of repentance for true faith in the Lord Jesus by stating that he did not preach faith only but repentance and faith. There can be little doubt that any theology of preaching must have a mission or purpose for preaching and that this purpose must include an expectation of repentance.

An Expectation of Regeneration

            The expectation of regeneration is so obvious that it requires little comment. After all, if the mission of preaching, according to Paul, is the presentation of everyone in a condition of spiritual maturity, one must acknowledge that before spiritual growth can take place, which us the path to spiritual maturity; one must first have experienced spiritual birth. This birth is what is meant by the term regeneration. Thus, it is obvious that a theology of preaching requires a preacher to have an expectation of regeneration when truly preaching the message that regenerates. This is the essence of the Gospel, according to Romans 1:16, “For I am not ashamed of the gospel, because it is God’s power for salvation to everyone who believes, first to the Jew, and also to the Greek” (HCSB). Thomas Schreiner pointed out, “The preaching of the Word does not merely make salvation possible but effects salvation in those who are called.”^[33] Thus, the preaching of the Gospel is a power that expects regeneration to take place because it affects that regeneration.[34] Thus, a theology of preaching ought to have a mission or purpose. That purpose must include an expectation of regeneration.

An Expectation of Reclamation

            That an expectation of reclamation is another facet of the mission or purpose of preaching is illustrated in part by Paul’s letters to the Corinthians. In the first letter, there is a reference to an individual who was illicitly involved with his father’s wife. “It is widely reported that there is sexual immorality among you, and the kind of sexual immorality that is not even _⌊tolerated_⌋ among the Gentiles —a man is living with his father’s wife” (1 Corinthians 5:1 HCSB). Paul’s intent to confront this sin is self-evident. However, in 2 Corinthians, Paul illustrates that confrontation is not the ultimate purpose. Instead the ultimate purpose is reclamation, “The punishment _⌊inflicted_⌋ by the majority is sufficient for that person. As a result, you should instead forgive and comfort him. Otherwise, this one may be overwhelmed by excessive grief” (2 Corinthians 2:6–7 HCSB). When commenting on this statement, Simon J. Kistemaker and William Hendriksen observe, “With respect to the offender, the Corinthians must change their thinking from removal to acceptance, from condemnation to restoration, from judgment to forgiveness, and from indignation to encouragement (Gal. 6:1). If there is genuine repentance, there must also be full-scale reinstatement. If God forgives a sinner, the church must do no less.”^[35]

            So as to remove any doubt that the confrontation and condemnation of sin should always be with an expectation of restoration, Paul stated in Galatians 6:1 (NASB95), “Brethren, even if anyone is caught in any trespass, you who are spiritual, restore such a one in a spirit of gentleness; each one looking to yourself, so that you too will not be tempted.”

            As one considers these biblical examples, it is clear that the man who preaches must preach the Word as described above. When such preaching is done accurately, it is inevitable that sin not only be recognized, confronted and condemned, but that preaching have as its mission, an expectation of reclamation. That is to say that the recognition, confrontation and condemnation of sin were not the end but the means to the end. The end is an expectation of reconciliation. Thus any biblical, evangelical theology of preaching must include an expectation of reclamation.

An Expectation of Renewal

            In identifying the purpose or mission of preaching, three expectations have thus far been recognized: an expectation of repentance, an expectation of regeneration and an expectation of reclamation. As has been stated, the preaching dynamic centers upon a proclamation of God’s message with an expectation of response. The specific end of that response is, as Paul stated, Christian maturity within the hearers of the message. Three expectations essential to that mission have been identified. The final one is the expectation of renewal.  

            The justification of this expectation as a legitimate expectation of the mission of preaching is illustrated in Paul’s letter to the Romans: “Therefore, brothers, by the mercies of God, I urge you to present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God; this is your spiritual worship. Do not be conformed to this age, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind, so that you may discern what is the good, pleasing, and perfect will of God” (Romans 12:1–2 HCSB).  That renewal, specifically a renewal of the mind, is a valid expectation of Paul’s preaching is herein made clear. Robert Mounce confirms the validity of this expectation, as part of the mission of preaching, in his commentary on this statement, “From without there is a continuing pressure to adopt the customs and mind-set of the world in which we live. Although that influence must be rejected, that alone will never create the kind of change God has in mind for his followers. Real and lasting change comes from within.”^[36] Clearly, there can be little doubt that any real progress toward mission of preaching and the ultimate goal of presenting everyone in a state of spiritual maturity must include an expectation of inner renewal.

Summary Thoughts

            That Paul’s ministry is the result of God’s calling and is an example for all who preach to follow is affirmed again and again by both biblical writers and subsequent commentaries. For example, Thomas Schreiner wrote, “Both in Romans and in Galatians the descriptions of Paul’s apostolic call are reminiscent of the calling to the prophetic ministry in the Old Testament.”3⁶ Included in his example for all biblical preaching, Paul identifies the mission or purpose for preaching to be the presentation of everyone as spiritually mature. To accomplish this, preaching must have certain expectations.  This is made obvious by several passages of Scripture which identify these expectations. Thus it is essential that an evangelical theology of preaching include a mission or purpose for preaching that includes an expectation of repentance, an expectation of regeneration, an expectation of reclamation and an expectation of renewal.

CONCLUSION

            Preaching is not the simple matter of standing before a congregation and telling stories which have moral lessons. Nor is it the ranting and raving about the personal opinion of a speaker who is for or against some behavior. While preaching may sometimes contain these things, they do not constitute the whole of preaching. If there is any understanding of what true preaching is, it is that preaching only takes place when the message of God is being preached by the man of God with the mission that God in mind. The man, his message and his mission must all coincide with their biblical mandates and examples for true evangelical preaching to take place. By identifying and reviewing these three essential elements of the theology of preaching, the assigned task has been accomplished.

            While it is certain that the views of this theology may not be shared by all who claim to be preachers, it is a view which is assuredly supported by God’s revelation of Himself and His purposes within the pages of Holy Scripture. In this essay, the man, the message and the mission of preaching have been identified and presented in such a way as to give a solid theology of preaching. This theology has not only been stated in regard to what it is, sufficient clarity has been provided to aid in identifying what it isn’t. Having done that, it is for those who have been called to the preaching task to accept or reject this theology. Hopefully some will now be more inclined to go and do that which God has called them to do, the way God has called them to do it and for the reasons God desires it to be done.  

            As a final remark, consider the following quote of William Ward Ayer:

Soft, innocuous preachments do not measure up to our tragic day. Sermons should stabilize listeners to know that Christianity is a virile faith. It does not deal with old wives’ fables but with eternal certainties. Our people must once again have an unshakable faith so deeply implanted that they can stand up to today’s infidelity and refute much of it. The preacher must also build into the lives of his people a faith that can stand against life’s oppositions and be capable of trusting where it cannot trace, believing where it cannot understand; knowing that when events seem stacked against us and the Bible seems untrue because of some recent discovery in science, the child of God can stand fast. For God’s Word, “established in heaven,” is able to vindicate itself.[37]

            May his warning be heeded, and may the theology presented in these pages be used to firm up “soft, innocuous preachments” that true evangelical preaching might be heard. The need for it in this age is self-evident.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, David L. "A Tale of Two Roads: Homiletics and Biblical Authority." The Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society (The Evangelical Society) 43, no. 3 (2000).

Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes. Edited by J.H. Freese. Translated by J.H. Freese. Vol. 22. Medford, MA: Harvard University Press: William Heinemann Ltd., 1926.

Arndt, William, Frederick W. Danker, and Walter Baur. A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature. 3rd. Chicago, IL: Chicago Press, 2000.

Ayer, Willam Ward. "The Art of Effective Preaching." Bibliotheca Sacra (Dallas Theological Seminary) 124, no. 493 (1976): 34.

Bock, Darrell L. Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament. Vols. Luke Volume 2:9:51-24:53. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1996.

Gerhard Kittel, ed. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. electronic ed. Edited by Geoffrey W Bromily, & Gerhard Friedrich. Vol. 3. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1964.

Henry, Carl Ferdinand Howard. God Revelation and Authority. Vol. 3. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1999.

Kistemaker, Simon J., and William Hendriksen. New Testament Commentary. Vol. 19 Exposition of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1953-2001.

Louw, Johannes P, and Eugene Albert Nida. Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament. electronic ed of 2nd edition. Vol. 1. New York: United Bible Societies, 1996.

Mirriam Webster Dictionary Online. Merriam Webster.com. n.d. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/preach (accessed August 1, 2012).

Mounce, Robert H. The New American Commentary. Vol. 27 Romans. Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman Publisher, 1995.

Myers, Allen C. The Eerdmans Bible Dictionary. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987.

Packer, J.I. "From the Scripture to the Sermon: I. Some Perspectives on Preaching." Ashland Theological Journal (Ashland Theological Seminary) 22 (1990): 38-43.

Schreiner, Thomas R. Baker Exegetical Commentary of the New Testament. Vol. 6 Romans. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1998.

Simeon, Charles. Horae Homileticae. Vol. 19:2. London: Holdsworth and Ball, 1833.

Vanhoozer, Kevin J. The Drama of Doctrin: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology. Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 2005.

Vine, W.E., Merrill F Unger, and William White. Vine's Complete Expository Dictionary of Old and New Testament Words. Vol. 2. Nashville, TN: Nelson, 1996.

Whitefield, George. Selected Sermons of George Whitefield. Oak Harbor, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc, 1999.

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                [1] To support the notion that much of what is called preaching really isn’t, consider the following statement of J.I. Packer. “[C]onsider whether we evangelicals, who so often cite the . . . words of Paul to each other and who claim to know so clearly that the preaching of the Word is the power-source of the church, can be said to succeed in rising to the demands of this insight that we inherit. I think it must be honestly admitted that often we fail here; we do not succeed in preaching the Word of God as plainly, pungently, and powerfully as we would like to do.” (J.I. Packer, “From the Scripture to the Sermon: I. Some Perspectives on Preaching,” Ashland Theological Journal Volume 22 (Ashland, OH: Ashland Theological Seminary, 1990), 38-43

                [2] Mirriam Webster Dictionary Online, “s.v. preach”  http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/preach, (Accessed June 23, 2012).

                [3] Gerhard Kittel, ed., Theological Dictionary of the New Testament Vol 3, Geoffrey W. Bromiley and Gerhard Friedrich, electronic ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1964-), 703, (s.v. khrussw).

               

                ^[4] J.I. Packer, p. 39.

                [5] “To publicly announce religious truths and principles while urging acceptance and compliance, ” (Johannes P. Louw and Eugene Albert Nida, vol. 1, Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament: Based on Semantic Domains, electronic ed. of the 2nd edition. (New York: United Bible Societies, 1996), 416), (s.v. khrussw)

                [6] W. E. Vine, Merrill F. Unger and William White, vol. 2, Vine's Complete Expository Dictionary of Old and New Testament Words (Nashville, TN: T. Nelson, 1996), (s.v. preach).

                [7] A fuller explanation of the Greek term translated “proclaiming” or “preaching” in Col. 1:28 is found  on page 17 and footnote 29.

                ^[8] J.I. Packer, p. 48.

                ^[9] George Whitefield, Selected Sermons of George Whitefield (Oak Harbor, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc., 1999).

                ^[10] Charles Simeon, Horae Homileticae Vol. 19: 2 Timothy to Hebrews (London: Holdsworth and Ball, 1833), 77

                ^[11] Charles Simeon, p. 57.

                ^[12] J.I. Packer, p. 52.

                ^[13] Ibid., p. 473

                [14] William Ward Ayer, “The Art of Effective Preaching,” Bibliotheca Sacra 124, 493 (Dallas, TX: Dallas Theological Seminary, 1976) p. 34

                ^[15] William Ward Ayer, p. 43.

                [16] Charles Simeon, p. 46

                [17] Carl Ferdinand Howard Henry, vol. 3, God, Revelation, and Authority,  (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1999), 429-30.

                [18] “To insist that the content of God’s revelation is unique is well and good, but if revelation is nonpropositional it cannot be intelligible, let alone true or false.” (Carl F. H. Henry, God Revelation and Authority, Vol 3. p. 429)

                [19] Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology, (Louisville, KY. John Knox Press, 2005) p. 266.

                ^[20] Carl Ferdinand Howard Henry, vol. 1, God Revelation and Authority, p. 45.

                [21] David L. Allen, “A Tale of Two Road: Homiletics and Biblical Authority,” The Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Vol. 43:3 (Lynchburg, VA: The Evangelical Theological Society, 2000) p. 490.

                ^[22] Allen C. Myers, The Eerdmans Bible Dictionary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987), 361.

                [23] William Ward Ayer, pp. 34-35

               

                [24] Ibid,, pp. 34-35

                [25] Ibid., p. 34.

                [26] Ibid., p. 36.

                ^[27] “Rhetoric is a counterpart of Dialectic; for both have to do with matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men and not confined to any special science.” (Aristotle, Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, Translated by J. H. Freese., ed. J. H. Freese (Medford, MA: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd., 1926). p. 1354a.

                [28] William Ward Ayer, p. 36.

                ^[29] Johannes P. Louw and Eugene Albert Nida, (s.v. kataggellw)

[30] See footnote 5.

                ^[31] William Arndt, Frederick W. Danker and Walter Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 995. (s.v. τέλειος)

                ^[32] Darrell L. Bock, “Luke Volume 2: 9:51–24:53”, Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1996), p. 1206.

                ^[33] Thomas R. Schreiner, vol. 6, Romans, Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1998), p. 60.

                [34] “The δύναμις θεοῦ (dynamis theou, power of God) in the gospel signifies the effective and transforming power that accompanies the preaching of the gospel. Elsewhere Paul describes the gospel as “the word of the cross” (ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ, ho logos ho tou staurou) that is “the power of God (δύναμις θεοῦ) to us who are being saved” (1 Cor. 1:18). The succeeding context of 1 Cor. 1 clarifies that the power of the gospel lies in its effective work in calling believers to salvation (1 Cor. 1:23–24, 26–29).” (Thomas R. Schreiner, vol. 6, Romans, Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1998), p. 60.) 

^[35] Simon J. Kistemaker and William Hendriksen, vol. 19, Exposition of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1953-2001), 78.

^[36] Robert H. Mounce, vol. 27, Romans, The New American Commentary (Nashville: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1995), 232.

                [37] William Ward Ayer, Bibliotheca Sacra, p. 36